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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

CHARLES PITTS, JR.
MARILYN J. PITTS,

HOWARD
and

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

PINE MEADOW RANCH, INC. , dba
JENSEN ASSOCIATES and dba
DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT, and JOHN DOES I THROUGH

Case No. 15428

x,
Defendants and
Appellants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant
corporations alleging damage to real property located in Summit County and requesting compensatory and punitive damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A judgment by default was entered on August 1, 1977 by
the Honorable David Dee in the amount of $36, 000.

Defendants'

Motion to Accept an Answer and Vacate the Default Judgment was
denied on August 31, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek vacati.on of the judgment and a remand to

-1-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the District Court for a trial upon the issues.

In the al-

ternative defendants seek a remand to the District Court for
a hearing on damages only or for an order of this Court vacating all punitive damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 2, 1976 a complaint was filed against the four
defendant corporations.

Plaintiffs alleged that they were

owners of a certain lot contained in Forest Meadow Ranch, swr,mit County, State of Utah.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants

trespassed upon said property, used the property as a dump,
destroyed valuable timber on the property, and committed waste
and destruction.

Plaintiffs asked for compensatory damages

of $11,000 for damages to the property, $15,000 trebled damages for destroying the timber, and an additional $10 ,000 as
general punitive damages.

(R., pp. 2-3).

A summons was issued by plaintiff's attorney on July 30,

1976.

(R., p.

4).

It was not served until approximately nine

months later on April 14, 1977.

(R., p.

5).

Approximately

3-1/2 months after service plaintiffs went before the Honor-

able David Dee and requested a default judgment be entered.
The minute entry reflects that the plaintiff was sworn and
examined.

(R., p. 7).

said hearing.

A court reporter was not present at

Accordingly, a judgment by default was entered

· ·
on August 1, 1977 and a default certificate
was en tered on Au·

-2-
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( R.

I

pp. 8 I 6) •

one week later plaintiff moved for an Order in Supplemental Proceedings.

(R., p. 9).

On August 11, 1977 Brent

Jensen was served with the Motion for Order in Supplemental
Proceedings.

(R.

I

p. 11).

on August 30, 1977 defendants moved "To Accept Answer And
Vacate Default Judgment".

(R., pp. 12-13).

An affidavit of

Stanley Adams, defendants' attorney, accompanied the motion.
(R.,

pp. 14-15).

(R.,

pp. 16-17).

A proposed answer was also filed at that time.

On August 31, 1977 defendants' ·Motion to Vacate came before the Honorable David Dee and after arguments of counsel
the motion was denied.

(R., p.

20).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
It is undisputed that the complaint in this action was
filed in August of 1976.

Nine months later in April of 1977

it was served upon Brent Jensen who was an officer and director of all of the defendant companies.

Three and one-half

months after service the default judgment was taken against
defendants.
During the hearing to set aside the default judgment de-

-3-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendants' counsel stated to the Court that Mr. Jensen

COUld

not specifically recall being served with the summons but tha:
he could not deny service.

The trial judge acknowledged at

the hearing that Mr. Jensen had been before him previously i~
a number of separate court proceedings involving real estate.
Defendants' counsel informed the Court that Jensen either became confused from the other cases or simply forgot to notif)'
his attorney.

Defendants' attorney stated in court and in

his affidavit that defendants had valid defenses to all of
plaintiffs' claims and were prepared to prove their defenses
if the judgment were vacated.

The record is also clear that

immediately upon being served with an Order In Supplemental
Proceedings defendants filed their motion to set aside the
judgment and filed a proposed answer to the complaint.
It is apparent from the Record that this is not a case i:
which a party has flagrantly violated court mandates by faili:,:
to file answers or discovery documents.

Except for the ini-

tial service of the complaint upon agent Jensen, there was ne·
ver any contact by plaintiff's attorney nor any type of notice
given that a default would be taken.

While notice may not be

required under the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obvious
that a case in which repeated demand or notice has been given
to a party is a much stronger case for affirmance o f a

d faul'

e

·

judgment than one where only an initial contact of service was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

made upon an agent representing many corporations.

There are, of course, numerous decisions by this Court

t

stating that a default judgment should be vacated if there is

any reasonable excuse so that a litigant may have his day in
court.

As stated by Justice Crockett in one such example:
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevokably
on a party without a hearing is obviously a
harsh and oppressive thing.
It is fundamental in our system of justice that each party
to the controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case.
For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse
to vacate a default judgment where there is
reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside. Mayhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 U.2d 52, 376
P.2d 951, 952 (1962) (Emphasis added).

See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P.2d 741 (Utah

1953); Central Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316 (Utah
1969); Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corporation, 545
P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).
Default judgments are indeed "harsh" remedies.

In this

case, however, an additional hardship is present since $20,000
of the $36,000 default judgment is for punitive damages.
Plaintiff claimed damage to their property of $11, 000, and
dw~age to their trees of $5,000 which was trebled pursuant

~Section 78-38-3, u.C.A.

The remaining $10,000 consisted

of punitive damages awarded for alleged injury in destroying
and wasting plaintiff's property.

Thus, even assuming plain-
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tiff's prayer to be correct, the default judgment included
compensatory damages of $16, 000 and punitive damages of

s20

"

Such a result can only be termed as extraordinarily harsh, L:
beyond the normal consequences of a default judgment.
Finally, the default judgment was taken in a county ot~:
than the correct county mandated by the Utah venue statute,
78-13-1, U. C.A.

This provision states that an action for in·

juries to real property must be tried in the county in which
the subject of the action is situated.

Thus, the default

judgment was entered in the wrong county causing confusion
on the part of defendants' attorney and being in clear viola·
tion of Utah statutory law.
Justice requires that defendants be given an opportunity
to defend the claims made against them.

Plaintiffs have sho1i

no substantial harm that will result by the vacating of the
default judgment especially since defendants have offered to
pay all costs incurred as a result of defendants' failure to
respond to the initial complaint.

For these reasons, there·

fore, the default judgment of $36, 000 should be vacated and
the case remanded to the District Court for venue transfer anc
trial on the issues.
POINT II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS NOT VACATED, THE CASE SHOULD BE
REi"IANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Rule 55(a) (2) states that a default judgment must be
taken by the Court in all cases where it is necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averrnent by evidence and that the court may conduct such
hearings as necessary and proper.

There is no question that

$20,000 of the judgment consisted of punitive damages.

Since

plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered $5,000 for the loss
of their timber the trebled award of $15,000 consisted of

$10,000 punitive damages upon the timber issue alone.
Court has stated in Pehrson v. Saderup, 498 P.2d 648

This
(Utah

1972) that treble damages cannot be obtained under Section
78-38-3 U.C.A. for a mistaken cutting of timber unless there
is evidence that the cutting was willful, wanton, or malicious.
These are elements of punitive damages.
Likewise, paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint specifically asks for punitive

da~ages

of $10,000 which must neces-

sarily partially include the cutting of the timber.
Unlike liquidated damages plead in a complaint, unliquidated damages must be specifically proved by a plaintiff if
he is to prevail in a default judgment.

In other words, the

entry of a default precludes defendant from offering testimony
in defense, but does not necessarily obviate the obligation of
the plaintiff to furnish adequate proof on the issue of damages.

Metric Investment Inc. v. Patterson, 236 A.2d 187 (Sup.

-7-
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Ct. N.J. 1967).
This same principle of liquidated damages especially
applies to punitive damages since their award is not a matt'·
of right but depends upon that degree of proof showing wanton and willful conduct of a defendant.

The quantum of Puni.

tive damages must be established by sufficient proof.
v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702

(2nd Cir. 1974).

-

Flaks

This Court has alsr

recognized the necessity of proof before punitive damages ca:.
be awarded in a default judgment.

Security Adjustment Bureai;

v. West, 437 P.2d 214 (Utah 1968).
In reviewing whether or not sufficient proof has been
offered to a trial court during a default proceeding the norr
rules of evidence are applicable.

Where proof of the cause c'

action or of the amount of a plaintiff's claim or demand is
necessary, the general rules of evidence apply in a proceedir.:
for a default judgment with regard to the admissibility and
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Plaintiff's proc:

must conform to his allegations, and must be sufficient to
out his case with legal certainty.

ma•

49 C.J.S., Judgments, Sec·

tion 213(b), pp. 375-376,
Thus, in order to show sufficient evidence for an award
of punitive damages there must appear, not only that there wa:
a wrongful invasion of plaintiffs' rights, but that it was
done willfully and maliciously.

-8-

It must appear that mere re-
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colltpense for actual loss is inadequate and that the plain-

tiffs should have added compensation.

The punitive damages

should not be unreasonably disproportionate to the actual
damages suffered or to the nature of the wrong done and the
injury caused.

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975);

Palombi v. D. & c. Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969).
In this instance there is no justification for an award
of punitive damages.

Even the plaintiffs' complaint fails

to contain the necessary allegations for punitive damages to
be awarded.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint ask for tre-

ble damages from destruction of the trees but do not allege
malicious or wanton conduct on the part of defendants.

Para-

graph 6 of the complaint while alleging "intentional" and
"willful" conduct does not allege "malice" or "wantonness"-necessary elements of a punitive damage allegation.

25 C.J.S.,

Damages, Section 123{b), p. 721.
The record itself contains no evidence of any malicious
conduct of defendants.

There is no record of the testimony of

plaintiff at the default hearing so it is impossible to know
what was stated before the trial court.

There are no findings,

minute entries, exhibits, or affidavits by which this Court
can review the award of punitive damages.
The Colorado court of Appeals in Norton v. Raymond, 491
P.2d 1403 (Ct. App. Colo. 1971) addressed this problem.

-9-
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Court stated:
It is the duty of the trial court to make
sufficient findings to enable the appellate
court to clearly understand the basis of
the trial court's decision and to enable
it to determine the grounds on which it
rendered its decision. The trial court
made no findings in this case as to jurisdiction, nature of the plaintiff's action,
basis of the court's decision, amount of
principal involved as distinguished from
interest in the final judgment, nor was
there evidence before the court at the time
the judgment was entered to give the basis
of any appropriate findings.

*

*

*

It is clear from the absence of evidence in the record that it is impossible
to determine if substantial justice has
been done. Therefore, in the interest of
substantial justice, the plaintiff should
be required to prove his claim and the defendant should be given an opportunity to
present his defense.
Id. at 1404-1405.
The Missouri Court of Appeals also addressed this ques·
tion of reviewing a default judgment containing punitive d~·
ages.

In that case a record of the proceedings had been made

to enable the appellate court to review the proof offered to
the trial court.

That court stated:

A review of the evidence leads us to the
conclusion that it is wholly insufficient
to sustain the judgment on that count.
Said count deals with alleged fraud and
misrepresentations by defendants with respect to the condition of the stairway of
the apartment building. The burden was
on plaintiff to adduce some substantial
evidence to sustain said allegations to
entitle him to actual damages, to say
nothing about punitive damages.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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*

*

*

As sometL~es happens in trials by
default, the evidence as to the second
count appears to have been presented hurriedly and without proper regard for its
probative value to prove the issues being tried.
The practice should be exactly
the opposite. Where a party seeks a judgment against another who is in default
and not represented by counsel, he should
proceed with even more care than usual to
see that all requirements of the law are
met. This for the very reason that the
other side is not represented.
Riley v.
White, 231 S.W.2d 291, 297-298 (Ct. App.
Mo. 1950).
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case there is no record or evidence in
the file showing a justification for the award of the unliquidated punitive damages.

The judgment on its face shows

that punitive damages were clearly excessive since they totaled $20,000 as opposed to $16,000 of compensatory damages
(even assuming such damages did in fact occur) •

As such

this Court, as a matter of law, should modify or vacate the
punitive damage award.

1975); Palombi v.

o.

&

Kesler v. Rogers 542 P.2d 354 (Utah

c.

Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969).

The Arizona Appellate Court in reviewing a default judgment for $50,000 concluded that there was no sufficient evidence in the record to justify such an award and remanded
the case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
upon the issue of damages alone.

The court stated:

We hold that when proof of damages after
a default in an unliquidated damage case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is as scanty as that presented to the court
here, an order setting aside a default judgment, but not the default itself, is justified,
Camacho v. Gardner, 435 P.2d 719
(Ariz. App. 1967).
Defendants respectfully request, therefore, that if ~G
Court fails to grant the relief asked for in Point r of this
brief, i.e. , vacation of the judgment and remand to the lower
court for trial of all issues, that a second or third remedy
be afforded defendants--reduction of the judgment as a matter
of law by this Court or remand to the trial court for a hearing of record limited solely to the question of damages,
CONCLUSION
A motion to set aside a default judgment necessarily in·
valves a weighing of substantial interests.

On the one hand,

it is in the interest of society to effectively provide a sys·
tern for redress of grievances and to discourage unnecessary
delay and breakdown of the system.

On the other hand, it is

desirable to provide all litigants a fair opportunity to pre·
sent their case and to receive a trial on the issues.
In the instant case there is no doubt that defendants'
agent neglected his duty to respond to the allegations of
plaintiffs' complaint within the time allowed by law.

Such

failure was clearly a mistake on the part of Mr. Jensen.

How-

ever, the record shows that this is not an instance where a
party has willfully refused to obey the court process or has

-12-
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i~tentionally

disregarded repeated demands to respond to

plaintiffs' pleadings.

Rather, it shows a pure and simple

case of excusable neglect and inadvertence on the part of
defendants.
In weighing the interests of the parties it should be
apparent that defendants' two-month tardy response does not
justify imposition of a judgment totaling $36,000--$20,000
of which is for punitive damages.

The normally harsh remedy

of default becomes unconscionably harsh with the addition of
the punitive damage award.
For this reason the previous decisions of this Court
and the dictates of substantial justice require that the judgment be vacated, that defendants be ordered to pay any damages incurred by plaintiffs for such delay, and that the case
be remanded to the trial court for adjudication of the issues.
In the alternative, although much less satisfactory in
view of the facts of this case, defendants request that the
case be remanded for a trial on the issue of damages alone or
that the judgment be reduced by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
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